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Army Expansibility

Mobilization: The State of the Field
Ken S. Gilliam and Barrett K. Parker

ABSTRACT: This article provides an overview of key definitions
and themes related to mobilization, especially of reserve component
forces, for large-scale contingency operations. The article also
discusses the US Army’s ongoing and future research efforts
on mobilization.

T

he current Army operating concept is to “Win in a complex
world.” But to accomplish that objective, the Army will need
to mobilize elements of the Army Reserve. In today’s Army,
the reserve components bring not only required capacity but also key
capabilities no longer resident in the active duty force. Understanding
the timelines and challenges associated with large-scale mobilizations is
critical to informing senior leaders’ decisions regarding the employment
of the total Army force during deliberate and crisis situations. In
accordance with the Army chief of staff ’s designated priorities, the
United States Army War College is conducting research to expand the
body of knowledge for this core task and enduring first-order problem.
Over the past fifteen years, the Army has become well practiced
at mobilizing and deploying the reserve components—both the Army
National Guard and the Army Reserve—for limited contingency
operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. Despite this experience,
many mobilization experts assert the current processes may prove
insufficient to mobilize the total Army force rapidly for large, sustained
contingency operations.1 While the term mobilization may seem to apply
only to the reserve components, a large-scale mobilization will impact
the entire Joint Force due to the anticipated competition for resources
including personnel, training areas, equipment, transportation, and
supporting organizations.

Mobilization: Definitions and Themes

In a broad sense the Department of Defense defines mobilization as
“the process by which the military services or part of them are brought
to a heightened state of readiness for war or other national emergency.
This includes activating all or part of the [Reserve Component] as well
as assembling and organizing personnel, supplies, and materiel.”2
Title 10 of the US Code (10 U.S.C.) defines different statutory levels
of mobilization ranging from voluntary call-up to total mobilization.3
1     Department of Strategic Wargaming, Full Mobilization Wargame White Paper (Carlisle, PA: Center
for Strategic Leadership, United States Army War College, 2016), 1.
2     US Department of Defense (DoD), Accessing the Reserve Components, Department of Defense
Instruction 1235.12 (Washington, DC: DoD, 2016).
3     10 U.S.C. §§ 12301–12304 (2017).
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Each level of mobilization is characterized by emergency authority,
level of military commitment, and length of mobilization.4 Current
mobilizations, for example, are in accordance with 10 U.S. C. § 12304(b).
Partial mobilization occurs under a presidential declaration of
emergency with limited activation of Reserve forces for a limited
duration. Full mobilization requires a Congressional declaration of national
emergency, provides access to all existing active and reserve forces, and
allows those forces to remain on active duty for up to six months after
the end of the crisis.
Large-scale mobilizations in the context of this article include
presidential reserve call-up, partial mobilization, full mobilization, and
total mobilization because these situations would require large-scale
force quantities beyond the currently planned mobilization capacity.
Mobilization is an enduring first-order problem. The Army War College
conducted a series of workshops and wargames to understand better the
Army’s readiness to mobilize the total Army force under full mobilization
authorities. Early research reveals a fragile assumption underpins Army
and combatant command contingency planning: every unit will be fully
ready for deployment on the date indicated in the deployment planning
documents. There is, however, no reliable way to inform these planning
dates because no model exists to quantify the time needed for the
Army Reserve and Army National Guard to achieve various levels of
mobilization readiness. Additionally, many of the mobilization process
challenges identified and cataloged over a decade ago remain challenges
today.5
The United States last mobilized for war in 1942, when ultimate
success was determined by industrial might developed over an extended
period of time, was protected by a relatively isolated homeland, and was
projected over great distances.6 Each of these three variables will be
tested if the United States conducts a large-scale mobilization. America’s
potential adversaries are not likely to provide the time necessary to
prepare adequately, and the US political system may provide its own
delays. Over reliance on space and cyber assets, once believed to be
protected from attack, seem increasingly vulnerable. A lack of strategic
lift capabilities also severely limits how quickly the United States can
project landpower globally.
Training timelines will increase. Unlike the first presidential mobilization
of the National Guard in 1916, when basic training was not a requirement,
today’s reserve components are expected to deploy at the same levels of
readiness as the active duty Army.7 Training and readiness timelines for
all units will continue to trend longer because of increased requirements
and emerging challenges.8 The Army’s goal to achieve sustainable
4     US Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Joint Mobilization Planning, Joint Publication 4-05 (Washington,
DC: JCS, 2014), I-6.
5     Reserve Forces Policy Board, Mobilization Reform: A Compilation of Significant Issues, Lessons
Learned and Studies Developed Since September 11, 2001 (Washington, DC: DoD, 2003), 2–5.
6     Ken S. Gilliam, “Repeating the Miracle of ’42: Fixing Army Mobilization,” War on the
Rocks, May 8, 2017, https://warontherocks.com/2017/05/repeating-the-miracle-of-42-fixing
-army-mobilization/.
7     Bob Haskell, “Dry Run,” National Guard 70, no. 11 (November 2016): 31.
8     Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), Enable, Resource, Build, Assess, and Sustain
Training Readiness, Execution Order 002-16 (Washington, DC: HQDA, 2016).
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readiness should have a positive impact on the number of individuals
and units ready to mobilize for large-scale contingency operations.9
Further analysis is, however, necessary to quantify and understand
how sustainable readiness initiatives will affect mobilization processes,
training timelines, and resource requirements.
Mobilization is the first step for more than half the total force. For Fiscal Year
2017, the reserve component is more than half of the total Army, with
343,000 Army National Guard and 199,000 Army Reserve soldiers.10
The current five year rotation model has approximately 2/5 of reserve
component units conducting or preparing for a mission. Sustainable
readiness initiatives will help, but the impact is unknown. The Army
needs to improve comprehension on the impact of mobilization timelines
when a large portion of the force is subject to statutory notifications and
susceptible to potential delays in personnel arriving to their units.11
Capabilities and capacities in the reserve components are critical for major war.
While combatant command contingency plans are based on available
resources and undergo a study of vigorous force flow, multiple conflicts
in different regions will strain the total force and present competing
signals for rapid delivery of all capabilities, not just low density, high
demand units. Success for any protracted conflict will depend on Army
Reserve capabilities and its capacity to sustain forces in theater as well
as the Army National Guard’s capacity to provide ready combat forces.12
Diversity and dispersion drive complexity. The reserve components depend
on a diverse and geographically dispersed population—such as dualstatus military technicians, civilian employment, and state militia—to fill
formations, which can significantly exacerbate mobilization timelines.
The commands and organizations that support and execute mobilization
tasks are also diverse. Medical, logistical, theater, service commands,
and active duty Army units all play their parts in mobilization, which
further complicates resourcing and decision-making.
The United States will be a contested homeland. The ability of an adversary
to disrupt mobilization processes in the homeland through cyber or
physical means can no longer be ignored. The mobilization processes
for reserve components contain vulnerabilities, such as reliance on
cell-phone communication for initial alerts and reporting, isolated unit
locations, and soldiers travelling long distances to report for duty, that
are not present for the active duty Army. Thus, simplistic attacks on
cellular infrastructure, isolated facilities, or transportation networks—
especially, if focused on small units providing key, low-density reserve
9     Hearing on the Posture of the United States Army, Before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 114th
Cong. 18 (March 5, 2015) (statement of John M. McHugh, Secretary of the US Army and Raymond
T. Odierno, Chief of Staff of the US Army)
10     Active Army end strength for fiscal year 2017 is 476,000 Soldiers. National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, Pub. L. No. 114-328, §§ 401–2.
11     Congress provided that soldiers in the reserve components who are called to active duty for
more than 30 days be provided at least a 30 day notice before the mobilization date, with a goal of
90 days notification. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L. No. 110181, 122 Stat. 99 § 515 (2008); and 10 U.S.C. § 12301. DoDI 1235.12 recognizes that some reserve
component members may not report to active duty if “it is physically impossible or would clearly be
a threat to the health, welfare, or safety of others” (21).
12     The US Army Reserve explains it “is structured to manage specialized capabilities, including
those not present anywhere else in the Joint Forces, such as sustainment capabilities required for
major operations, but too expensive to maintain on active duty, such as theater-level transportation,
engineer, and logistics units” (January 12, 2017, www.usar.army.mil/About-Us).
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capabilities, such as bridging, refueling, or biological agent detection—
could effectively lengthen initial musters and reporting.

Ongoing Efforts

Many on-going efforts across the Army are examining mobilization
issues. United States Forces Command and the First United States Army
continue to refine the steady-state mobilization processes while planning
for relatively small-scale mobilizations to support combatant command
contingency plans. The Army G-3/5/7 is coordinating analysis to
support large-scale mobilizations related to Defense planning guidance.
Most recently, the Army chief of staff designated mobilization as a
strategic research priority for the US Army War College. Coordinating
these efforts further and instituting the research as an Army warfighting
challenge (AWFC) would solidify an enterprise-wide emphasis to
ensure mobilization research and analysis endures beyond the current
leadership.
Warfighting challenges, “enduring first order problems, the
solutions to which will improve the combat effectiveness of the current
and future force,” are the focus of the Army Capabilities Integration
Center (ARCIC).13 A review of the current warfighting challenges,
and their associated learning demands, reveals a limited treatment of
mobilization along very narrow lines of inquiry.14 Not addressed are
the personnel, installation, training, equipment, and transportation
challenges associated with mobilizing a larger force, which will be
needed for simultaneous or near-simultaneous contingency operations
in a defeat-deny-defend scenario. The current disconnected nature of
these mobilization elements within the warfighting challenges highlights
the disjointed nature of mobilization within the Army enterprise.

A Way Ahead

Building on previous wargame insights and leveraging the Army
chief of staff’s strategic research mandate, the US Army War College
will undertake a deliberate study to deliver a digital mobilization proving
ground. This simulated environment will allow senior leaders to make
decisions about the mobilization enterprise and policies, to test them
over the long-term and with various conditions, and to determine if the
decision will produce acceptable results. The approach over the next two
years will build on previous Army War College research, which advocates
for a layered approach of addressing each of the levels of mobilization:
• Make the steady-state mobilization system more efficient in conducting
deliberate mobilizations. Current small scale mobilizations provide
the framework for decision-making during larger scale scenarios.
• Build a system that can rapidly accommodate a contingency
mobilization. Refining the current systems and understanding which
13     Army Capabilities Integration Center, Army Warfighting Challenges (Fort Eustis, VA: ARCIC,
January 31, 2017), slides, www.arcic.army.mil/Initiatives/ArmyWarfightingChallenges.
14     In early 2017, only two challenges addressed mobilization related issues: “What CONUS/
OCONUS infrastructure capabilities are necessary to ensure the rapid deployment of entry operation
forces?” (12, learning demand 9), and “What organizational design changes can be enacted in the
Near-, Mid-, and Far-Terms which improve speed of employment and/or close or mitigate capability
gaps?” (20, learning demand 8). “Initiatives: Army Warfighting Challenges,” ARCIC, January 9, 2017,
www.arcic.army.mil/.
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processes will quickly scale and which will take more deliberate actions
allows for more relevant and timely application of resources.
• Develop a plan to mobilize a force capable of executing a complex
scenario. It is critical for the Army to define and understand clearly
the initial mobilization actions and the limitations associated with
multiple near-simultaneous contingencies. Developing a plan at the
time of crisis will cause unnecessary delay.
• Understand the decisions senior leaders will encounter and the strategic
trade-offs and risks associated with a full mobilization. In a complex
scenario, leaders will be compelled to balance force readiness, time of
delivery, and operational challenges with limited resources.
• Understand vulnerabilities and impacts in a contested homeland.
Globalization and increased cyber and space capabilities reduce
America’s physical isolation from potential adversaries. It is necessary
to define how these elements will drive force generation and allocation.
• Think strategically about the challenges associated with a total
mobilization, to include expanding the force. Adding manpower
and matériel to the current structure will require time and extensive
resources. The Army must understand the strategic implications of
expansion and be prepared to influence the national level dialog.15
The research team will consist of a diverse group of faculty from
several external partners, including the United States Military Academy,
Forces Command, Center for Army Analysis, and United States
Transportation Command. The team will focus on the implications of
full mobilization for the Army and the Joint Force during the first year;
total mobilization during the second. Researchers will conduct analysis
using senior leader engagements, workshops, and wargames throughout
the study period.
The first year of research and analysis is already underway. The
first event, a test of the prototype simulation against a single combatant
command operations plan, will occur in September 2017. Further testing
will incorporate progressively larger demand signals, starting with two
operations plans in November 2017, then a full mobilization scenario in
February 2018. Lastly, in keeping with the researcher role, the Army War
College will ask resident and distance education students to examine
strategic mobilization issues and use the simulation to test plausible
futures. Preliminary results are expected to be released in May 2018.
The second year of research and analysis will focus on total
mobilization and the implications associated with expanding the force
and the industrial base. This effort will incorporate insights from
faculty and student research from the previous year. Projected research
questions include:
• What insights might previous mobilizations provide for the future?
An examination and analysis of historical large-scale mobilizations

15     Department of Strategic Wargaming, Full Mobilization Wargame, 4.
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can set the stage for planning and potentially prevent relearning
lessons the hard way.
How did the current concepts and practices of mobilization come
to exist? Understanding the intent of statutory requirements and
evolution of the current system can shape future recommendations.
What are the strategic implications of large-scale mobilizations? Better
understanding of mobilization limitations and requirements might
alter the strategic scenarios which drive defense resourcing decisions.
How quickly can the Army achieve the various levels of mobilization?
It is critical to understand the capabilities and limitations of the current
system in order to inform future decisions.
What is the proper command and control structure for mobilization?
Organizing the Army for large-scale mobilization sets the stage for
effective, integrated decision-making.
How much installation infrastructure is necessary to mobilize the total
Army? Understanding the current capacities and shortfalls informs
planning and rapid contingency decision-making.
Which policies and procedures need to change in order to mobilize the
total Army quickly? Understanding the trade-offs and risks associated
with these changes enables decision-makers to identify alternative
approaches and maximize available resources.
What effect, if any, do different contingencies have on mobilization
requirements and timelines? Awareness of the resources needed to
respond to diverse threats in a variety of battlespaces, and possibly
against multiple foes, builds the capability to mobilize the total Army
effectively.
How can we make mobilizations more robust and less vulnerable to
interference? Recognizing mobilization vulnerabilities presents Army
leadership with opportunities to develop contingencies that would
facilitate total-force mobilization.
How can the Army exercise the tasks associated with large-scale
mobilizations? Wargaming mobilization under diverse scenarios will
help the Army anticipate critical challenges.

The challenges associated with large-scale mobilization, which
are too complex to begin addressing at the time of crisis, make it an
enduring first-order problem. Mobilizing the total Army force requires
a collaborative effort across the entire enterprise to assess requirements,
identify capabilities, develop solutions, and implement decisions. This is
exactly the environment provided by the Army warfighting challenges
analytical framework. Through rigorous research and analysis, the
US Army War College will provide senior leaders with findings and
recommendations to improve the readiness of the current and future force.
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